Property: Limitations

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46  +, Like many terrorist attacks  +, Logroño and Granada. Moreover  +,
Problem of fake news and disinformation. Problems of accessibility: there are some accessibility rules that have not been satisfied in the platform.  +
Problem of fake news and disinformation. Problems of accessibility: there are some accessibility rules that have not been satisfied.  +
In the support network  +, after the perpetrator was captured  +, and citizens had recovered from the initial shock  +,
The authorities had difficulties grasping some unfortunate aspects of the internet culture and understanding dynamics on image boards such as 4chan. They were rather unequipped to handle such massive amounts of false information and tell authentic volunteer helpers apart from pranksters.  +
- it was not so easy to verify all the information - fake news  +
The lack of data from fuel suppliers (with an exception for PRIO)  +, the lack of data from official entities (at government and regulator level) were the main limitations identified to provide a even more reliable information to the populations.  +
-It was difficult to get in touch with the residents about relevant info. The Greater Copenhagen Fire Department was pressed on their internal communication resources.  +
Even with recent efforts based on Social Media and AI Disaster Risk Management Solutions  +, based on information released by the meteorological agency and geological surveys.  +, it is essential to note that some types of landslides may occur without any anomalies in prior observations and end up hitting residents suddenly. Under these circumstances  +,
2) They were inadequately equipped to communicate relevant information in a timely manner  +, 290 Norwegian Twitter accounts posting on the incident during the critical hours between 15.25 and 21.00 on 22 July  +, Justin Bieber’s Twitter account was by far the most mentioned during and after the attacks (tweets containing #prayfornorway and referring to @justinbieber made up the most frequent hashtag/@mentions combination). The poor crisis communication by the police as well as their general crisis management attracted massive criticism and were analyzed in detail on various occasions in the aftermath of the attacks. Some of their most crucial mistakes research and official reports agree upon are: 1) There was a general lack of coordination between the central police department in Oslo and the police district responsible for Utoya and virtual any communication foundations to mediate between them: there was virtually an absence of any communication infrastructure in the crucial area  +,
GG)  +, OSINT is not explicitly covered in the German code of criminal procedure (Strafprozessordnung  +, The implementation of OSINT within law enforcement units bears several technical as well as legal challenges. 1) Intel officers need at least two workstations  +,
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. What followed was a long discussion and investigation trying to clarify who was responsible for the fact that the perpetrator had not been under surveillance (and if social media monitoring in terms of predictive policing would have prevented the attack) and the authorities could not manage to gain interpretational sovereignty over this discourse.  +, Even though the Berlin police handled the crisis communication during the attack extremely well  +, the assassin had been known to the German security authorities beforehand and was classified as an Islamist threat. The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant gave him instructions and ISIL released a video of him pledging allegiance to the terror group's then-leader  +,
- Disengagement once the emergency period is over. This process is delicate and needs to be planned accurately. How do you keep the volunteers periodically engaged to ensure they will be available for the next emergency? - Control over volunteers. As the project grows in scale and volunteers are directly in contact with beneficiaries  +, you need to ensure a similar scale up of control and reporting mechanisms to ensure safe programming.  +
Barcelona  +, Brussels  +, Stockholm  +,