Property: Limitations

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The uploaded video was not immediately evaluated in a targeted manner. The evaluation of content from social media is not yet part of the standard routine.  +
Several tabloid media outlets shared photos and videos of the crime  +, whereupon they were heavily criticized on social media and several hundreds of complaints were received by the Austrian Press Council. Austrian journalist Ingrid Brodnig rates the sharing of the videos as wrong. It is a danger for people on the ground and hinders the ongoing police operation. Apart from the fact that in this way one acts in the sense of the terrorists.  +
The first tweet was written 13 minutes after the attack  +, a great deal of the discourse on social media shifted to political controversies or to expressions of outrage concerning news coverage which drowned information relevant for the emergency management again. Later  +, a lot of false information was added to the already dysfunctional dynamics – e.g.  +,
There were two main problems with the platform: the occurance of fake news and disinformation  +, and the overly strict rules for accessibility of the platform.  +
46  +, Like many terrorist attacks  +, Logroño and Granada. Moreover  +,
Specific challenges are not reported. However  +, two challenges are obvious: # the population must be encouraged to participate (which has worked well here through the public television channels (ARD & SWR)) # the evaluation of the reports must be very time-consuming and demanding due to free-text answers.  +
On social media  +, a Swedish public television station reported live at around 3.00 p.m. that it had received witness statements about shots being fired near the scene. Such news of an ongoing attack led to increasing public uncertainty. In addition  +, and citizens had recovered from the initial shock - the dynamics surrounding #openstockholm changed drastically. Against the backdrop of evolving political debates on immigration laws and increased state measures to track down illegal immigrants in Sweden  +,
Radio communication did not work well.  +
As many online platforms  +, there was a problem of accessibility: as some rules are not satisfactory yet.  +, this one also suffers the danger of fake news and disinformation. In addition  +
Disengagement once the emergency period is over. This process is delicate and needs to be planned accurately. How do you keep the volunteers periodically engaged to ensure they will be available for the next emergency? Control over volunteers. As the project grows in scale and volunteers are directly in contact with beneficiaries  +, you need to ensure a similar scale up of control and reporting mechanisms to ensure safe programming.  +
The lack of data from fuel suppliers (with an exception for PRIO)  +, the lack of data from official entities (at government and regulator level) were the main limitations identified to provide a even more reliable information to the populations.  +
GG)  +, OSINT is not explicitly covered in the German code of criminal procedure (Strafprozessordnung  +, The implementation of OSINT within law enforcement units bears several technical as well as legal challenges. 1) Intel officers need at least two workstations  +,
Even with recent efforts based on Social Media and AI Disaster Risk Management Solutions  +, based on information released by the meteorological agency and geological surveys.  +, it is essential to note that some types of landslides may occur without any anomalies in prior observations and end up hitting residents suddenly. Under these circumstances  +,
The authorities had difficulties grasping some unfortunate aspects of the internet culture and understanding dynamics on image boards such as 4chan. They were rather unequipped to handle such massive amounts of false information and tell authentic volunteer helpers apart from pranksters. Witnesses from various cities in North Rhine-Westphalia testified to having seen the perpetrator  +, a massive amount of false information circulated online misleading the investigation. A letter was for instance identified as (potentially) authentic material from the perpetrator whereupon the police launched a public search for a dog which was completely unaffiliated with the crime. The real perpetrator on the other hand posted an actual photo of his second victim but with the wrongful claim that he had just killed an adult woman and would kill the daughter next.  +, the suspicion was not confirmed in any of the cases and did not contribute to the advances of the investigation. In remains unclear to date how many of those accounts were from people how wrongfully identified someone as the attacker but had the actual intention to assist the police and how many were deliberate hoaxes. Besides the false eyewitness account  +,
2) They were inadequately equipped to communicate relevant information in a timely manner  +, 290 Norwegian Twitter accounts posting on the incident during the critical hours between 15.25 and 21.00 on 22 July  +, Justin Bieber’s Twitter account was by far the most mentioned during and after the attacks (tweets containing #prayfornorway and referring to @justinbieber made up the most frequent hashtag/@mentions combination). The poor crisis communication by the police as well as their general crisis management attracted massive criticism and were analyzed in detail on various occasions in the aftermath of the attacks. Some of their most crucial mistakes research and official reports agree upon are: 1) There was a general lack of coordination between the central police department in Oslo and the police district responsible for Utoya and virtual any communication foundations to mediate between them: there was virtually an absence of any communication infrastructure in the crucial area  +,
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. What followed was a long discussion and investigation trying to clarify who was responsible for the fact that the perpetrator had not been under surveillance (and if social media monitoring in terms of predictive policing would have prevented the attack) and the authorities could not manage to gain interpretational sovereignty over this discourse.  +, Even though the Berlin police handled the crisis communication during the attack extremely well  +, the assassin had been known to the German security authorities beforehand and was classified as an Islamist threat. The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant gave him instructions and ISIL released a video of him pledging allegiance to the terror group's then-leader  +,
The evaluation of social media is not yet a SOP. The incident commanders travel to the scene and after reconnaissance define the tactics on the spot. However  +, during the travel and the reconnaissance  +, important information is already available in social media  +,
Sometimes there are negative comments e.g. that fire fighters are arriving at the scene very late during storms. People tend to ignore that the capacity of the rescue forces to react immediately is limited (mass handling  +, overload of calls  +, prioritization needed facing up to 100 real incidents per minute in the capital) Sometimes there are very rude comments and those posts are erased. The person who is handling the SM sites is also a moderator  +,
Plausibility must be checked for all searches  +, and specially trained personnel are required for this purpose.  +
During the events  +, causing panic in the city  +, rumors are spread on social media  +,