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2) They were inadequately equipped to communicate relevant information in a timely manner +
290 Norwegian Twitter accounts posting on the incident during the critical hours between 15.25 and 21.00 on 22 July +
Justin Bieber’s Twitter account was by far … Justin Bieber’s Twitter account was by far the most mentioned during and after the attacks (tweets containing #prayfornorway and referring to @justinbieber made up the most frequent hashtag/@mentions combination).The poor crisis communication by the police as well as their general crisis management attracted massive criticism and were analyzed in detail on various occasions in the aftermath of the attacks. Some of their most crucial mistakes research and official reports agree upon are:1) There was a general lack of coordination between the central police department in Oslo and the police district responsible for Utoya and virtual any communication foundations to mediate between them: there was virtually an absence of any communication infrastructure in the crucial areaication infrastructure in the crucial area +
The hashtags mentioned above were used to … The hashtags mentioned above were used to structure the communication accompanying the chaotic events and tried to make sense of them – yet this happened relatively late: it took the Twitter-sphere more than 30 minutes after the bomb blast before the hashtag #osloexpl was established that made it possible to monitor Twitter in a systematic way for updates. What was even more severeway for updates. What was even more severe +
and that several of the killed campers could still be alive. Concrete suggestions for improvements from survivors On the positive side +
and the Norwegian Security Police (PST) belonged to the absentees. Instead +
chose to post an alert on Twitter to make … chose to post an alert on Twitter to make the public aware of the extent of the attack after he had called the police who did not seem to grasp the seriousness of the situation.4) The mobilization among citizens – in terms of their actions to save people from the attack and expressions of public opinion on social media – were not always in line with law enforcement. Not having anticipated this role of the publichaving anticipated this role of the public +
is was not ensured that all districts had communication staff and regularly practiced crisis handling +
just as someone unaffiliated could +
let to the bizarre fact that the incident was used to seek attention from international pop stars +
made the management of the crisis more complex for the rescue teams and authorities because they all of a sudden had to respond to those dynamics. In 2012 +
only nine came from public bodies (releasing a total of 22 tweets with the account of Oslo Airport being the most active with eight tweets). In fact +
particularly on Twitter +
particularly through their neglect of social media. Due to the delay in identifying the perpetrator +
plans for strategic communication were poorly updated +
several emergency organizations and authorities were not even on social media back then - the Directorate for Civil Protection +
since the victims are aware of the problem of fake photos and videos +
so that future victims are also better equipped to validate social media information during an attack. Yet +
someone who intentionally wants to harm ot … someone who intentionally wants to harm others and therefore might strategically use social media as well.Survivors for instance expressed that they were reluctant to post relevant information such as their location publicly on social media because they feared the attacker might be monitoring social media for such informationnitoring social media for such information +
such a tool should not be designed for the … such a tool should not be designed for the use in emergencies only because then too little people would be familiar with it to actually use it in such an unlikely event. 4) Authorities involved in crisis response should have a joint social media emergency account which is well known to the public (similar to the emergency numbers 911 for the US or 112 across the EU).bers 911 for the US or 112 across the EU). +
such an upload-functionally should ideally have integrated verification tools. 3) Such verification tools should also be made accessible for the public +
the Commission on 22 July even came to the devastating conclusion that if the police had acted earlier +
the Norwegian Twitter-community was dominated by young girls at the time which e.g. +
the fire departments +
the first-hand accounts from survivors rep … the first-hand accounts from survivors repeatedly pointed out a very important aspect in which a terrorist attack differs from other kinds of disasters and that is thus often neglected in recommendations for effective crisis management - though it tremendously affects social media communication: in a terrorist attack there is a perpetrator a terrorist attack there is a perpetrator +
the operating police departments +
the public discourse +
the survivors also derived relatively conc … the survivors also derived relatively concrete recommendations for improvements for future crisis management via social media from their experiences: 1) Authorities should offer functionalities for none-public two-way communication with affected people. This does not only help to protect their physical safety but also their anonymity since most victims likely do not want to be publicly known (stigmatized) as such.2) It should be possible for affected citizens to send pictures and videos to the police (e.g.nd pictures and videos to the police (e.g. +
the victims did not dare to trust that information (and looking at the timestamp of that post +
they were right not to do so). Yet +
they would have had the possibility to stop the perpetrator before he reached Utøya +
to show the perpetrator’s face). Yet +
too. They also stressed the aspect of cred … too. They also stressed the aspect of credibility in this context. They pointed out that on the internet anyone can say anything and pretend to be anyone. A perpetrator who entered the island disguised as a police officer could well do the same on the internet and intentionally launch false informationand intentionally launch false information +
was for instance vulnerable to rumors: speculations about a possible al-Qaida involvement in the attacks were circulated in the early stages where information was lacking +
was that none of the organizations in charge for the crisis management took the lead (or even part) in this structuring process. Of the 8 +
when someone said that the police were on the island and everyone was safe now +
which in turn gave rise to hostile tweets … which in turn gave rise to hostile tweets against Muslims or immigrants in general.3) They were also inadequately equipped to respond to relevant information in a timely manner: survivors reported that they tried to contact the police or get people on the mainland to do it for them. One of them e.g.inland to do it for them. One of them e.g. +
who might think this is funny. So +