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  • 2) They were inadequately equipped to communicate relevant information in a timely manner  +
  • 290 Norwegian Twitter accounts posting on the incident during the critical hours between 15.25 and 21.00 on 22 July  +
  • Justin Bieber’s Twitter account was by farJustin Bieber’s Twitter account was by far the most mentioned during and after the attacks (tweets containing #prayfornorway and referring to @justinbieber made up the most frequent hashtag/@mentions combination).</br>The poor crisis communication by the police as well as their general crisis management attracted massive criticism and were analyzed in detail on various occasions in the aftermath of the attacks. Some of their most crucial mistakes research and official reports agree upon are:</br></br>1) There was a general lack of coordination between the central police department in Oslo and the police district responsible for Utoya and virtual any communication foundations to mediate between them: there was virtually an absence of any communication infrastructure in the crucial areaication infrastructure in the crucial area  +
  • The hashtags mentioned above were used to The hashtags mentioned above were used to structure the communication accompanying the chaotic events and tried to make sense of them – yet this happened relatively late: it took the Twitter-sphere more than 30 minutes after the bomb blast before the hashtag #osloexpl was established that made it possible to monitor Twitter in a systematic way for updates. What was even more severeway for updates. What was even more severe  +
  • and the Norwegian Security Police (PST) belonged to the absentees. Instead  +
  • chose to post an alert on Twitter to make chose to post an alert on Twitter to make the public aware of the extent of the attack after he had called the police who did not seem to grasp the seriousness of the situation.</br></br>4) The mobilization among citizens – in terms of their actions to save people from the attack and expressions of public opinion on social media – were not always in line with law enforcement. Not having anticipated this role of the publichaving anticipated this role of the public  +
  • is was not ensured that all districts had communication staff and regularly practiced crisis handling  +
  • let to the bizarre fact that the incident was used to seek attention from international pop stars  +
  • made the management of the crisis more complex for the rescue teams and authorities because they all of a sudden had to respond to those dynamics. In 2012  +
  • only nine came from public bodies (releasing a total of 22 tweets with the account of Oslo Airport being the most active with eight tweets). In fact  +
  • particularly on Twitter  +
  • particularly through their neglect of social media. Due to the delay in identifying the perpetrator  +
  • plans for strategic communication were poorly updated  +
  • several emergency organizations and authorities were not even on social media back then - the Directorate for Civil Protection  +
  • the Norwegian Twitter-community was dominated by young girls at the time which e.g.  +
  • the fire departments  +
  • the operating police departments  +
  • the public discourse  +
  • was for instance vulnerable to rumors: speculations about a possible al-Qaida involvement in the attacks were circulated in the early stages where information was lacking  +
  • was that none of the organizations in charge for the crisis management took the lead (or even part) in this structuring process. Of the 8  +